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Abstract 
This paper examines the vulnerability of wireless systems to interception, and provides 
some simple steps that can be taken to improve security.  A commercially available 
computational electromagnetics software package was used to predict signal levels in 
complex indoor and urban environments. The simulation results can be used to 
determine the detection range of the network. Two basic scenarios are presented:  (1) 
indoor-to-outdoor propagation for a local area network operating in a two story 
building, and (2) a wireless point-to-point link on an airbase.  The simulations 
illustrate some of the unique propagation conditions that occur inside of buildings and 
in urban areas. This research has identified several possible system weaknesses and 
suggested some simple, yet effective, methods of improving security. 
 
Introduction 
A variety of wireless systems are used in both the civilian and military sectors.  Some 
reasons for choosing wireless local area networks (WLANs) and point-to-point (PTP) 
systems over hardwired networks are their real-time information availability, 
achievable high bandwidths, resilience to failures, and simple and rapid installation 
(Boerner, 1995; Pahlavan, 1995).   
 
One concern in deploying systems that radiate in free space is the possibility of signals 
being intercepted by unauthorized users.  The first step in the hacking process is to 
gain unauthorized access to network traffic.  In many cases this is most easily 
accomplished by intercepting wireless signals.  Authentication and encryption provide 
data security.  Complex encryption techniques make it difficult for the average person 
to penetrate the system, however, the algorithms that are built into the network 
software have been defeated by knowledgeable hackers (Singhal, 2001; Conjungi, 
2003).  Although wireless security is vastly improved since the first generation 
systems, the threats continue to grow, and maintaining security is a constant challenge 
(ITworld, 2004).  Predicting and subsequently controlling the electromagnetic 
radiation is an effective means of securing the network. 
 
In the case of WLANs, even though the power levels involved are low, a person in a 
public lobby or just outside of a building could conceivably tap into a system in a 
restricted area.  Even for PTP systems that use directive antennas, the antenna 
illumination area on the ground (i.e., its “footprint”) increases with the range between 
two network nodes.  Additionally, there are unique propagation conditions that occur 
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inside of buildings and in urban areas that can enhance signal detection under certain 
circumstances.  Thus, wireless systems are vulnerable to uninvited intruders who could 
collect sensitive information or possibly even disrupt the computer network by 
injecting deceptive signals.   
 
Electromagnetic wave propagation modeling in indoor and urban environments is 
difficult because of the interactions between a large number of scattering objects such 
as walls and furniture.  Modern buildings and furnishings use many materials that 
affect propagation by attenuation, reflection, and diffraction.  Building walls, floors, 
landscapes, and even passing cars affect the manner in which these signals propagate.  
The underlying electromagnetic theory is well understood (Balanis, 1989; Molkdar, 
1991), and accurate propagation simulations are achievable with sufficient 
computational resources (i.e., computer processing time and memory) and high-fidelity 
building models.  It is often the lack of knowledge of the materials enclosed in a 
building wall that limits the accuracy of a simulation, rather than any shortcoming in 
the electromagnetic analysis.  
 
Overview 
This paper examines the vulnerability of WLAN and PTP systems to interception, and 
provides some simple steps that can be taken to improve security.  A commercially 
available computational electromagnetics (CEM) software package was used to predict 
signal levels in complex indoor and urban environments. The simulations assume that 
the WLAN access point or one of the PTP nodes is transmitting. The simulation 
outputs are contours of power levels on a grid of observation points that can be used to 
predict the radiated power distribution of the network.  Given the specification of an 
intercept receiver, it is possible to convert the power contours to detection ranges.  
 
Two basic scenarios are presented, which represent a small fraction of the many cases 
simulated in the course of the research (Sumagaysay, 2002; Lim, 2003).  The first is 
WLAN indoor-to-outdoor propagation for a two-story building that might be occupied 
by a small business. The second is a wireless PTP link on an airbase that is used to 
transmit targeting data to a hangar where it is then disseminated through a local 
WLAN to the various aircraft being housed.  These cases were selected because they 
illustrate some of the unique propagation effects that can occur in urban areas. 
 
Propagation Modeling 
Radio wave propagation in urban areas is complicated, but it is traditionally attributed 
to three basic mechanisms: (1) reflection, (2) diffraction, and (3) scattering (Anderson, 
et al 1995).  As a result of these propagation mechanisms, the received signal strength 
from an access point can be roughly characterized by three nearly independent 
phenomena of large-scale path loss, large-scale shadowing, and multi-path fading.  
Network links in urban environments are subjected to severe degradation due to the 
superposition of many contributions to the three components. 
 
For a narrow band wireless system operating at frequency f, the received power rP  
from an access point transmitting a power tP  with antenna gain tG  at range R is given 
by the Friis equation (Balanis, 1997)  
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The wavelength is /c fλ =  where 83 10c = ×  m/s is the phase velocity in free space.  
For a WLAN, the user’s antenna gain is assumed to be isotropic (omni-directional), 
1rG = . The miscellaneous loss and processing gain factors, L and pG , respectively, 
are system dependent.  The path-gain factor (PGF) F gives the total signal (electric 
field intensity) at the user’s location relative to the direct free-space signal.  The PPF is 
computed by the software using the given geometry and media electrical parameters. 
 
Because the reflecting and diffracting objects are large compared to the wavelength, 
high-frequency ray-tracing approximations can be applied, as illustrated in Figure 1 
(Deschamps, 1972).   In addition to the direct path signal, for ray-based propagation 
modeling, the contributors to the total electric field intensity are the many reflected and 
diffracted signals that occur in the environment.  They arise from the ground and 
foliage, or buildings and other manmade objects on the ground or in the air. At a given 
an observation point in space, the total field will be the sum of all of the direct, 














Figure 1:  Illustration of some possible ray paths for the simple case of a glass slab and metal wall 
 (top view). 
 
Formulas are available for the reflected and diffracted fields based on geometrical 
optics (GO) and the geometrical theory of diffraction (GTD) (Balanis, 1989).  They 
incorporate coefficients that linearly relate the reflected and diffracted fields to the 
incident fields at the reflection and diffraction points, respectively.  In the case of 
reflection, the traditional Fresnel coefficients for planar boundaries can be used 
(Balanis, 1989).  Specular (mirror-like) reflections must satisfy Snell’s law: the angle 
of reflection equals the angle of incidence. Edge-diffracted fields also follow known 
trajectories; they lie on a cone whose axis is coincident with the diffracting edge and 
half angle is determined by the angle of the incident ray with the edge (Keller 1962).   
The formulas for the reflection and diffraction coefficients depend on the electrical 
properties of the materials.  The materials are defined by their relative permittivity, 
relative permeability, and surface resistivity (Balanis, 1989).  Combinations of these 
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parameters can be used to achieve the electrical characteristics of any building 
material.  
 
While there are several engineering tools to predict antenna radiation and wave 
propagation, Urbana (SAIC 1999) was selected for this research.  It was selected 
because of its pre- and post-processing capabilities, as well as having been extensively 
validated (Andersh, et al ,1996). The propagation model is a three-dimensional ray-
tracing process that in principle predicts the local mean power received at any given 
point.  For each observation point, reflection and diffraction points on all surfaces are 
determined, the ray paths between the transmitter and receiver are traced, and then the 
vector sum of multi-path signals computed.  The observation points are at the centers 
of user-defined cells. The model includes the effects of wave polarization and antenna 
patterns. 
 
The number of reflected and diffracted rays needed for a converged solution must be 
determined from the minimum signal level that is to be reliably computed, and in an 
urban environment this is difficult to predict in advance.   Convergence is established 
by increasing the number of ray contributions until the computed result has stabilized. 
 
Indoor-To-Outdoor Propagation 
Figure 2 shows a model of a two-story building that might be occupied by a small 
business.  The building footprint is a square that is 40 feet (12.12 m) on a side.  The 
building walls are a metal composite, and standard glass windows are used.  A WLAN 
access point antenna was considered to be transmitting.  The signal levels were 
calculated at points inside and outside of the building. The observation cell size is a 
square with edge lengths of 1 ft (30.48 cm).  Therefore the “pixel” size for the 
resulting contour image is 1 ft by 1 ft (30.48 by 30.48 cm).  Since this is much greater 
than the wavelength of the frequencies under consideration (λ = 0.125 m at 2.54 GHz), 
the field strength at other points in the cell will fluctuate about the center value.  
Small-scale variations in the field are not captured, but large-scale path loss and 
shadowing is. More resolution can be achieved at the expense of increased 
computation time.  
 
 
Figure 2: Computer model of a two-story office building. 
 
The receiver sensitivity is the minimum power required for maintaining the link. 
WLAN sensitivities range from –94 dBm for 1 Mbps to –85 dBm for 11 Mbps (Cisco, 
2002), where dBm is a decibel relative to a milliwatt reference (Balanis, 1997) 
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Figure 3 shows the signal distribution for a transmitter power of 100 milliwatts. The 
solid and dashed lines represent exterior and interior wall locations, respectively.  The 
access point antenna is on the first floor, at x = y = 50 inches (denoted by the location 
of the “o” in the figure).  Strong signals passing through the windows are evident. 
Although the strongest signals are confined to the interior of the building, significant 
levels are transmitted through the walls and windows.  Roughly speaking, no 
interception would be possible in the dark areas using standard network receivers.  
Note that at the lowest data rate, interception is possible over most of the 
computational grid of 1800 inches (150 feet = 45.45 m) on a side. Sophisticated 
intercept receivers can be designed with much lower receiver sensitivities. 
 
For the data in Figure 4 the standard glass windows are replaced by tinted glass. There 
has been a significant reduction in the power outside of the building.  A further 
reduction in the signal level outside can be achieved by moving the transmit antenna to 
the second floor, as evident in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 3: Power levels for a building with metal composite walls and standard glass windows.  Units 
are decibels relative to a milliwatt (dBm). 
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Figure 4: Outside power levels are reduced using tinted glass, which reflects signals 
back into the building. 
 
 
Figure 5: Outside power levels are reduced further after moving the access point antenna 
to the second floor. 
 
Military Airbase.  
In the near future, aircraft pre-launched codes, including weapons stores data, 
waypoints coordinates and other mission critical data will be transmitted via a wireless 
link to the hangar where it is then disseminated through a local WLAN to the various 
aircraft. The aircraft, upon successfully receiving the codes and uploading them to 
their respective mission computers, will then transmit back an acknowledgement 
signal. Security measures are in place throughout the airbase, including patrols around 
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the perimeter, except perhaps a limited number of office buildings that are open to 
contractors and visitors. The objective of this scenario is to determine if there are 
possible security weaknesses that could arise. In particular, are there areas inside of the 
public buildings where sufficient signal strength exists so that interception is possible? 
 
Figure 6 shows the airbase model with a point-to-point link between the control tower 
and aircraft hanger.  The buildings are comprised of glass and concrete.  PTP networks 
use high gain antennas with relatively narrow beam widths compared to those of 
WLAN access point antennas.  Figure 7 shows the signal levels at two heights for a 
vertically polarized antenna with a 15-degree half power beam width (HPBW), when 
transmitting 30 dBm. At the higher observation level, the fine structure of the antenna 
sidelobes is evident.  In the airbase model, the heights of the transmitting and receiving 
antennas are not the same.  In order to point the main beam of the two antennas 
directly at each other, they have to be rotated. A downward pointing of the antenna 
results in more sidelobe peaks intercepting the ground plane.  The peaks lead to 
localized areas of high signal strength, or so-called “hotspots.” 
 
Figure 8 shows the signal contours at a height of 2 meters above the ground when the 
antenna at the hanger is transmitting and pointed directly at the tower. Figure 9 shows 
the contours that result when the antenna at on the control tower is transmitting.  In the 
second case, it was observed that there was a hotspot, as indicated in Figure 9, with a 
level near 30 dBm. This is due to the orientation of the cluster of the buildings, which 
were closer to the control tower than to the aircraft hangar. The junctions of two 
vertical building walls along with the ground serve as an effective “corner reflector” 
that can focus the signal at a limited number of nearby points. This presents a potential 
opportunity for covert entities to hack into the system. It is interesting to note that the 
hotspots caused by local features in the geometry (e.g., a corner reflector) are not 
reciprocal in the sense that they may be present when transmitting from control tower 
to the hangar, but not when transmitting from the hangar to the control tower. 
 
 
Figure 6: Airbase model with a point-to-point link between a control tower and aircraft hanger. 
Building edges are highlighted. 
 
Vulnerability of Wireless Networks to Interception 






 z = 0
 z  
z = 0 m
z = 7 m
ANTENNA
HEIGHT
z = 16 m
 
Figure 7: The antenna radiation at observation points on the ground (z = 0) and at z = 7 m above the 
ground.  The antenna height is z = 16 m. 
 
Figure 8: Signal contours 2 m above the ground when transmitting from the hanger to the control tower. 
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Figure 9: Signal contours 2 m above the ground when transmitting from the control tower to the hanger. 
 
Guidelines and Recommendations  
Wireless systems can have surprisingly large detection ranges when they transmit at 
their highest power level. This research has demonstrated that some simple steps can 
be taken to reduce the detection range.  For WLANs they include: 
1. Locating access points in the most interior building spaces 
2. Closing all exterior doors and windows 
3. Using metal blinds or tinting on exterior windows  
4. Using directive or sectored access point antennas to confine the direction of strong 
radiation  
5. Using the lowest possible power settings  
6. Signal containment is most efficient for buildings with metal exterior walls as 
compared to those with wood walls 
 
The findings also indicate that there are numerous vulnerabilities associated with 
wireless PTP communication systems that may not be apparent by physical 
examination of the building layouts.  The simulation results have shown that sporadic 
hotspots may appear due to the building geometry, particularly near the ground in the 
vicinity of corners. 
 
There is a widely held misconception that PTP wireless systems are not susceptible 
because they use narrow beam antennas. Furthermore, the antennas are generally 
located on building rooftops, which makes it difficult for intercept receivers to position 
themselves directly in the antenna’s field of view. However, this research has 
demonstrated that adequate signal strength for interception most likely exists well 
outside of the antenna main beam.  Some simple precautions that can be taken to 
reduce the detection range of a PTP system include: 
 
1. Performing a high fidelity EM simulation of the proposed wireless path to identify 
hotspots 
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2. Properly selecting the user’s receiver sensitivity so that the minimum power level 
can be transmitted (this technique is known as power management) 
3. Stepping up physical security in the regions where the signal is strong enough for 
interception 
4. Implementation of more advanced software encryption techniques 
5. Incorporating low probability of intercept methods in the waveform design, e.g., 
frequency hopping (Couch 1995) 
 
Conclusions 
The fact that a WLAN is contained inside of a closed building, or PTP antennas are in 
a restricted area, may lead to a false sense of security.  Many small businesses use 
these networks, yet their system administrators are not aware of the susceptibility of 
the systems to interception, or feel that they do not have the resources to tighten 
security.  This research has identified several possible system weaknesses and 
suggested some simple, yet effective, methods of improving security. 
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